Frivaldszky János – Kevevári István:Michel Rosenfeld dekonstrukciója. Nr. 2014/1.
In our paper we discuss Michel Rosenfeld’s theory of legal interpretation. Rosenfeld connects the contemporary crisis of legal interpretation with the problem of pluralism. His theory of ‘comprehensive pluralism’, based on the Derridean concept of justice, tries to create a device that could bring together various meanings in postmodern pluralistic societies without being relativistic or monistic. We discuss the interpretive tasks described by Rosenfeld from a critical perspective.
Rosenfeld created an interesting deconstructive theory which has more in common with moral or political theories than legal philosophy. However, his theory cannot solve the final problems of legal philosophy, as for example the debate over legal status of the fetus. We argue that problems of legal theory and legal interpretation cannot be solved without taking into account the basic principles of classical legal thought.